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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 15928

CARNES CORPORATION,
Defendant and
Respondent,
and
LONG DEMING UTAH, INC.,
Defendant.
BRIEF OF

APPELL&~T

STATEMENT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CASE
The prolonged proceedings in the lower Court in this
matter requires, in the opinion of Appellant's Counsel, a
more complete explanation in this brief than the usual desired
one sentence statement suggested by the Rules as to the Nature
of the case.

This matter has been before the Courts since

October 26, 1973.
Court.

There have been two prior references to this

Accordingly, Appellant undertakes to make a more meaning-

ful Statement of the Nature of the Case, which hopefully may
assist the Court to an early understanding of the problem and
to make more pertinent the exposition of the details which will
be later set out in the brief.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Appellant, Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., is a Utah
Corporation.

Under a written Sales Representative Agreement

with Carnes Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation, it performed
services in the sale of Carnes products to the L.D.S. Church
which Brownbelieves entitles it to the payment of a commission
by Carnes in the amount of some Fifty Thousand Dollars.

Before

payment of the commission which Brown believed it earned,
Carnes cancelled the Sales Representative Agreement with Brown,
and entered into an agreement with Long Deming Utah, Inc., a
Utah corporation.

Subsequently, Brown was informed, Carnes

paid the commission which Brown believed itself to be entitledto,
to Long Deming Utah, Inc.

Since the entire matter arose out

of the construction of the L.D.S. Church Office Building, the
actions "rh1.ch :;a•re rise to the claim took place in Utah, involved

pr1.mar1~i

~tah

people, and two Utah corporations.

Brown

and its counsel believed that the proper forum for presentation
of the cause was the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Accordingly, Brown filed its

complaint there October 26, 1973.

Counsel for Brown had no

doubt, applying the then recognized standards for securing
jurisdiction over the out of State Wisconsin corporation that
it could be accomplished both under the Utah Long Arm Statute
78-27-22 et seq. UCA 1953 as amended, and also under the
provisions of Rule 4(e)(4)

URCP.

Summons was accordingly

served in both manners upon Carnes.

The matter now before this

Court involves solely the effort by Brown to secure jurisdiction
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the Utah Court.

The merits of the case have never been

Fresented or considered.
This case has been twice previously before this Court on
various aspects of the effort by Aprellant to secure jurisdiction over the Respondent Carnes Corporation in the State of
Utah.

The first time upon an Interlocutory Appeal sought by

Carnes Corporation from an Order of Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.,
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, vacating an attachment issued by that Court against Carnes and ruling that Carnes,
in asking that the attachment be vacated and that t:1e Utah law
on attachment be declared unconstitutional, had made a general
appearance and was subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
This Court granted the Appeal and ruled that Carnes had not
made a general appearance, docket number 14057.

This case

was before this Court once again on a second petition by
Respondent Carnes for Interlocutory Appeal from an Order of
the Honorable David Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, granting a special setting and hearing on the jurisdictional facts to Brown.

The second petition for Interlocutory

Appeal was denied by this court, docket number 15564.

The

present Appeal is the first brought before this Court by
Appellant Brown.

At the present stage of this case, Long

Deming Utah, Inc., defendant, is not involved in the Appeal.
The present conflict involves solely the effort by the plaintiff
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. to establish jurisdiction
over the defendant Carnes.

Carnes Corporation was originally

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-3Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a Wisconsin corporation and is presently an unincorporated
division of WEHR CORPORATION, a Wisconsin corporation.

(R255)

More than five years before the Court has been consumed in the
effort by the plaintiff and Appellant Ted R. Brown and
Associates, Inc. to establish jurisdiction over Carnes.

The

case presents clearly the difficulty and frustration encountered
by the plaintiff and its counsel in attempting to achieve what
should be a litigant's primary right, to have the Court permit
the adequate development of the facts and then to examine and
apply the applicable law thereto.
yet been achieved.

This simple goal has not

The review of this case will necessitate

a painstaking and detailed examination of the entire record
of the proceedings in the Court below.
a fifty pac2

~r~ef,

ficant problems.

We recognize that in

we can only hope to highlight the signi-

We earnestly beseech this Court to afford

this matter the careful consideration that the basic issues
involved herein entitle it to receive.

The decision should

not be based upon technicalities of inter Court relationships
between Judges of the same Court, nor upon one Judge's view
of the

act~ons

of counsel which counsel has never been asked

or allowed to explain to the Court.
The plaintiff-Appellant, Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc.,
will throughout this brief be referred to as either Brown, or
as Appellant.

The defendant, Carnes Corporation, will be

referred to hereinafter as Carnes or Respondent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
Initially Judge Gordon R. Hall entered an Order Dismissing the claims and quashing service of Summons on Carnes.
(Rll7) On application made by Brown for reconsideration and
to vacate the Order the Order was amended by striking the
portion which dismissed the claims of Brown, but left standing
the portion which quashed service of Summons on Carnes.

(R74-75)

Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. issued an attachment on funds of
Carnes on application of Brown which he subsequently vacated
but entered an Order declaring Carnes subject to jurisdiction
of the Court by reason of a general appearance.

(R65)

The

Supreme Court overturned Judge Hanson's ruling on Interlocutory Appeal by Carnes, Supreme Court Docket No. 14057. Judge G.
Hal Taylor refused to consider a motion to declare jurisdiction established over Carnes and that an Order be issued to
require answer or be declared in default, stating that there
was no precedent therefore nor any rule under which he could
so uct and he, therefore, denied the motion.

(R224)

After

re-service of Summons and a new Motion to Quash, Judge David
Dee issued an Order granting to Brown a special hearing at
which evidence could be introduced and testimony be taken
relative to:

(a)

Carnes activities in the State of Utah

which would subject it to jurisdiction under the Long Arm
Statute; and (b)

The nature of the relationship of Carnes

to its sales representative to determine whether service
thereon would meet the requirements of Rule 4 (e) (4) URCP.

(R304)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Carnes petitioned for Interlocutory Appeal of Judge Dee's
Order.

This petition was denied, Supreme Court Docket No.

15564.

After the evidentiary hearing before Judge Leary,

held pursuant to the requirements of Judge Dee's Order, Judge
Leary entered an Order refusing to consider the facts on the
question of jurisdiction and, in effect, imposing sanctions
for what he

app~rently

considered on his own motion and with-

out notice to counsel or an opportunity to respond thereto,
a failure by counsel for Brown to conduct adequate discovery
and entered an Order of Dismissal declaring himself to be
bound by the earlier ruling of Judge Hall.

(R350-357)

NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have both the Order of Gordon R. Hall
and the Order of Peter F. Leary granting the motion of the
defendant C3rnes for dismissal and quashing service of Summons
reversed and vacated.

Appellant asks this Court to recognize

the sufficiency of the service of Summons upon the defendant
Carnes and the jurisdiction of the District Court of Salt Lake
County over the defendant Carnes.

The case should be remanded

to the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Carnes
should be allowed to plead to the Amended Complaint and the
case should be tried on the merits.
STATEMEN~

OF FACTS

As previously stated in the introduction to this brief,
this appeal involves solely the effort of Appellant to obtain
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
-6-may contain errors.

jurisdiction over the Respondent Carnes in a lawsuit commenced
in the District Court of Salt Lake County.

Appellant filed

its Complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County,
October 26, 1973, in which Appellant is named as plaintiff,
the defendant Carnes Corporation is named as defendant and
Long Deming Utah, Inc. is named as a defendant.

(Rl60-l63)

The Complaint alleges that Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc.,
a Utah corporation, had a Sales Representative Agreement with
Carnes Corporation whereby Ted R. Brown and Associates sold
products of Carnes Corporation in the State of Utah.

(Rl60-16l)

Acting in collaboration with participating Carnes personnel,
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. sold a specifically fabricated product and other material manufactured by Carnes and
used in the heating and air conditioning systems of the new
church office building constructed in Salt Lake City for the
L.D.S. Church.

(Rl60-16l,R537 through 542)

Before the Church

Office Building was constructed, but after the Carnes material
had been selected by the Church architect and incorporated in
the specifications due to Brown's efforts,

(R523-530) Carnes

Corporation cancelled Brown's representative agreement and
appointed Long Deming Utah, Inc. as its sales representative
in Utah

(Rl61-162).

Carnes refused to pay to Ted R. Brown and

Associates, Inc. the commission which it had earned for sale
of the Church Office Building job and to which Ted R. Brown
and Associates laid claim.

(Rl60-l63)

Brown learned that the

commission had been paid to Long Deming Utah, Inc.

This action

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

was commenced to recover the commission from Carnes and from
Long Deming Utah, Inc. and damages for the failure to honor
the contract with Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc.
163)

(Rl60-

Appellant, through its counsel, caused Summons to be

issued upon the Complaint and service was duly made upon Long
Deming Utah, Inc. as sales representative of Carnes Corporation
in Utah, by serving Lynn Felton, an officer of Long Deming
Utah, Inc.

(Rl56)

This service was made pursuant to the pro-

visions of Rule 4 (e) ( 4) URCP.

Brown also caused Summons to

be served under the Long Arm Statute of Utah, 78-27-22 et seq.,
UCA 1953 as amended, on Carnes by making personal service on
Richard Nichols, a Vice President of Carnes Corporation at the
home office of the company at Verona, Dane County, Wisconsin.
(Rl59)

Long Deming Utah, Inc. answered to the Complaint within

the tine

allo~~ed.

(Rl41-143)

Carnes, through its counsel,

filed a Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss.

(Rl39)

It should

be noted that the motion was filed November 29, 1973, and
recited that an affidavit in support thereof would be filed
subsequently, that it was then in preparation.

(Rl39)

The

affidavit of Richard Nichols was not filed until January 4,
19 7 4 .

( Rl3 5 )

Due to the many factors which do not appear in

the record because no issue has at any time been raised in
regard thereto, the motion was not called up for hearing before
the Court until October l, 1974.

(Rl24)

It was called up, as

is the usual procedure, before the Law and Motion Division of
the Court.

The matter was presented on oral argument and the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

affidavit of Nichols (Rl35-l37)
~lr.

and of Ted R. Brown (Rl33-l34),

0. l'lcod Moyle III appearing for Carnes and Craig G. Adamson

appearing for Brown.

Judge Hall took the matter under advise-

ment and subsequently, on October 18, 1974, entered an Order
dismissing the claims of the plaintiff Brown and quashing the
service of Summons against Carnes.

(Rll7-ll8)

Appellant, on

October 25, 1974, fil"ed a Motion for Reconsideration or to
Vacate or in the Alternative Amend the Judgement.

(Rll3) This

motion was not immediately called up for hearing before the
Court by Appellant because in the meantime counsel for the
Appellant had learned that the final payment for the construction of the L.D.S. Church Office Building had not been made
and that, possibly, the Church or the general contractor might
still have funds which would be ultimately paid to Carnes.
Accordingly, on November 4, 1974, Appellant applied to the
Court for issuance of a Writ of Attachment.
was issued and served.

(Rl09)

(R57, 44, 55, 56, 107)

The Writ

No funds were

attached, however, both parties attached advising they held
no such funds.
Motion

(R77)

Mr. Moyle on behalf of Carnes filed a

to Release the Attachment on the grounds that there was

no Complaint on file within the meaning of Rule 64C, that the
Rule 64C did not comply with the Constitution of the United
States, and further alleging that the attachment was not
issued in compliance with Rule 64C.

(Rl02)

On January 8, 1975,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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being apprised that the parties attached claimed not to have
any funds belonging to Carnes and seeking to elicit further
information which might possibly be used at a future hearing
on the motion pending before Judge Hall, Appellant served a
Notice of Taking of Deposition of the Vice President of Long
Deming Utah, Inc., Lynn Felton.

(Rl03)

This was promptly

met by counsel for Long Deming Utah, Inc., who filed a Motion
for Protective Order and to Quash Request for Production of
Documents

(R99-l00) on January 14, 1975.

A reply to this

Motion for Protective Order was filed by Appellant on January
16, 1975.

On January 16, 1975, counsel for Carnes called up

by Notice of Hearing, the motion pending before Judge Hall
for reconsideration of the Judgment entered by him and also
the motion o= Carnes for release of attachment.
was tc C:1e

~~card

January 23, 1975.

(R93)

(R93)

This

An amended Notice

of Hearing dated January 17, 1975, and filed by counsel for
Carnes on January 20, 1975, rescheduled the proposed hearing
to February 11, 1975, at 9:00 a.m.

(R95)

At the hearing

before Judge Hall on this Motion, he was requested by counsel
for the Appellant to vacate his Order Quashing Service of
Summons and set the matter for a hearing at which the facts
concerning the activities of Carnes in the State of Utah
might be shown by an evidentiary hearing which could not be
had before the Law and Motion Division. Judge Hall recognized
his error in dismissing the plaintiff's claims and amended
his Order by striking the portion of the Order which so
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, -10administered by the Utah State Library.
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provided, but he refused to reconsider the Order to Quash
Service of Summons and denied the verbal request for a further
hearing on that matter.

(R74-75)

Judge Hall refused to con-

sider the matter of the release of attachment stating that
since this was issued by Judge Hanson, it would have to be
pre sen ted to Judge Hanson.

( R7 5)

was entered on March 5, 1975.

The Order of Judge Hall

Thereafter Appellant, acting

under Rule 72(a) preserved its right of appeal from Judge
Hall's Order by filing a Notice of Intention to Appeal.

(R70)

On March 18, 1975, Appellant filed a Motion for Order Determining Defendant Carnes had Entered a General Appearance,
Declaring Jurisdiction of the Court over Carnes, and Requiring
Carnes to Answer to the Complaint.

This motion together with

the Motion of Long Deming for a protective Order and the
Motion to Release the Attachment, filed by Carnes, were all
noticed up for hearing before Judge Hanson on the 26th day of
Narch, 1975.

(R68)

On the day appointed, all parties appeared

by counsel and the matters were argued to the Court.

(R65)

Judge Hanson ordered the attachment released for irregularities in compliance with rules relating to pre-judgment attachments, but held that Carnes, in seeking a Constitutional
determination on the matter of the attachment procedures and
Rules in Utah, had entered a general appearance and ordered
that Carnes answer to the Complaint within ten days from the
entry of the Order.

The parties stipulated that the matter

ofSponsored
the by
protective
sought
by Long
Deming
inandpart
been
the S.J. Quinney LawOrder
Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by
the Institute had
of Museum
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rendered moot by the other rulings of the Court and accordingly
the Court struck the matter from the calendar to be recalled
when and if desired by either party.

(R65-66)

Carnes promptly petitioned for an Interlocutory Appeal
to this Court from the Order of Judge Hanson.
granted.

The appeal was

This Court ruled that Carnes had not made a general

appearance and that the Order of Judge Hanson in so determining
and requiring Carnes to answer should be and was set aside.
(Docket No. 14057 in the Supreme Court)

To re-activate the

proceedings in the District Court, Appellant elected to file
a Hotion Declaring Service of Summons on Carnes Sufficient
and requesting that the Court order Carnes to Answer or be
found in default.

(Rl98)

This matter was called up before

Judge G. Hal Taylor who was at that time sitting on law and
mot:w:-,, to be heard on February 17, 1977.

(R219)

At the

hearing counsel for Brown moved the Court to set a special
hearing at which evidence could be presented concerning the
activities of Carnes in the State of Utah which Appellant
believed sufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction of the
Utah Courts.

Judge Taylor stated that he could find no rule

under which the motion presented could be made and refused to
consider the same on the ground that there was no

precedent

therefore and the Court had no authority to make such an Order.
The Court also denied the Motion made orally for a hearing on
the evidence.

(R221, 222, 223)
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Acting under Rule 4(b) where service has been obtained
upon one defendant within the year,

(service having been

had on Long Deming Utah, Inc.) Appellant issued a new Summons
and caused the same to be served on the newly appointed sales
representative for Carnes, Utemp - Utah Air Sales, which was
duly served by the Sheriff on Richard Bartlett McDowell, an
officer of Utemp -Utah Air Sales.

(R230)

Appellant also

caused service under the Long Arm Statute to be made by
making service upon an officer of the Carnes Company at its
home office in Verona, Wisconsin.
J. Kessler, process agent.

The Sheriff served Bruce

(R234-235)

Appellant had preserved

its right to appeal from the Order entered by G. Hal Taylor
by filing a Notice of Intention to Appeal under Rule 72(a).
(R227)

Carnes, again acting through its attorney, 0. Wood

Moyle III, filed a Motion to Dismiss.

(R232)

Instead of

calling up this new Motion to Dismiss before the Law and
Motion Division of the Court for hearing, Appellant filed a
motion asking that a special hearing be granted at which
evidence and testimony could be presented before the Court
on the activities of Carnes in the State of Utah, and of the
activities of Utemp - Utah Air Sales, its sales representative.
(R237-238)

This matter was heard before Judge David Dee on

August 23, 1977 at 2:00p.m.

Judge Dee heard the arguments

of counsel, reviewed the record and considered the affidavit
filed by the parties as well as the extensive memoranda submitted by counsel in support of their respective positions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and then made and entered a memorandum decision followed by
an Order based thereon which granted the special hearing
requested by Appellant and provided:
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
"1.
The motion of the plaintiff for
an order designating a special setting
for an evidentiary hearing is granted
and said hearing shall not be limited
solely to evidence concerning the service
of process on Richard Barrett McDowell.
The parties shall be permitted to present
all evidence pertinent to determination
of the question of whether or not Carnes
was doing business in the State of Utah
so as to subject said corporation to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State.
"2. Counsel for the plaintiff shall
arrange for such evidentiary hearing before
one of the judges assigned to the Trial
Division of this Court.
"3. The claim of the defendant Carnes
in support of its motion to dismjss, that
the entire issue of jurisdiction of the
Court over the defendant Carnes is Res
Judlcata, is denied." (R304)
Carnes, through its counsel, objected to the Order and a
further hearing was granted but the Court entered an Order
denying and overruling the objections of Carnes to the above
mentioned Order.
17, 1977.

(R302-303)

This Order was entered November

Carnes promptly petitioned the Supreme Court for

an Interlocutory Appeal on the ground that the matter of
jurisdiction over Carnes was res judicata by reason of Judge
Hall's and Judge Taylor's rulings and that therefore Judge
Dee could not make such an Order.

Appellant answered Carne's

petition
for Interlocutory Appeal. The Supreme Court entered
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an Order on January 11, 1978, denying the
Appeal.

Interlocutor~

(See the Record on the petition and supporting

memoranda in the file of this Court under docket number
15564, also R320.)
Appellant in compliance with the Order of Judge Dee
arranged a hearing at which evidence could be adduced and
testimony of witnesses taken.

This hearing was scheduled

before the Honorable Judge Peter F. Leary on January 11, 1978,
at 10:00 a.m.

(R308)

A full hearing was held before the

Court, both Appellant and Carnes presented evidence and
Witnesses.

A comprehensive statement of the prior pro-

ceedings and the status of the matter was made to the Court
by counsel for both parties.

(R405-424)

The proceedings

before Judge Leary continued through January 12, 1978.
Judge Leary was fully advised by counsel of the Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal taken to the Supreme Court from Judge
Dee's Order on grounds that the issue of jurisdiction over
Carnes was res judicata by virtue of the Order previously
entered by Judge Hall, and was notified that the Petition
had been denied and a copy of the Notice of the decision of
the Supreme Court was filed with the Court. (R320,419)
position of the parties was fully argued to the Court.
Leary took the matter under advisement.

The
Judge

He subsequently, on

March 31, 1978, entered a memorandum decision.

(R322-326)

The

decision ignored the facts presented and totally failed to
comply with the terms of the Order of Judge Dee which was the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-15-

basis for the hearing before Judge Leary.

(R322-326)

A

proposed Order was presented and Appellant promptly presented
objections to the Order of Judge Leary Quashing Service of
Process on Carnes.

(R342-347)

A hearing was had before Judge

Leary on the objections on May 2, 1978, at 1:00 p.m. Judge
Leary expressed himself as dissatisfied with the Order presented
by Counsel for Carnes,
"The Court will take a look at the matter.
But I would--do make this comment, Mr.
Hovle: that I don't think that the
Order which was prepared for the Court's
signature precisely sets forth what the
Court intended by its memorandum decision.
I' 11 take a look at it."
(R395)
In fact, Judge Leary did nothing and the Order objected
to by Appellant was entered.

This appeal is prosecuted from

that Order and from the other orders denying the jurisdiction
over Carnes the right of appeal from which had been preserved
under Rule 72(a) as more particularly hereinbefore delineated
in this statement of facts.
The facts developed in the evidentiary hearing before
Judge Leary on January 11 and 12, 1978, supported the initial
affidavit of Ted R. Brown which reflected that Carnes was in
fact doing business within the State of Utah, and that it was
a substantial volume of business.

(R387-674)

The details of

this conduct on the part of Carnes which Appellant contends
subjects it to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts will be
more specifically developed in the Argument.
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This statement comprises, we believe, an adequate presentation of the factual situation.

If a dd't·
l lana 1 facts appear

necessary to any part of the argument, they will be set forth
therein.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT CARNES HAS DONE BUSINESS
IVITHIN THE STATE or UTAH \IHTHIN THE
DEFINITION OF THE LONG ARM STATUTE
OF UTAH AND THE SERVICE OF SUt1!·lONS
ON CARNES VESTS THE UTAH COURT I'IITH
JURISDICTION.
At least since May 24, 1961, when Carnes Corporation of
Verona, Wisconsin entered into a Sales Agreement with Ted R.
Brown and Associates, it has been doing business within the
State of Utah.

(Rl45)

The extensive activities within this

State commenced with contracting with a sales representative
to actively solicit sales of Carnes products in this State.
(Rl45,

203, 600, and Ex lP)

While the Sales Agreement pur-

ported to be providing for the services of the sales representative as independent contractors, it was uniformly testified
by Ted R. Brown, Lynn Felton, Richard McDowell, and James A.
Carlsen, that while Carnes did not maintain a place of business
as such in the State of Utah, that the sales representative
was given sales literature by Carnes upon which he was to
place his name, address, and telephone number and distribute
the same and actively let it be known that he was the representative of Carnes in the State of Utah.

(R427,468, 497, 601,602)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-17-OCR, may contain errors.

Goods sold were shipped directly to the customer in Utah,
freight allowed, all freight being paid by Carnes, billing
was direct by Carnes to the customer.

(R453, 451, 477)

The

goods were warranted and the warranty was in writing by Carnes
direct to the customer.

(R 443, 478-481)

If there were any

problems in respect to any materials supplied to Utah consumers,
they complained to the Utah sales representative who usually
re?resented Carnes in the handling of the matter unless, as in
the case of the Church Office Building, Carnes elected to send
personnel to handle the matter from the home office.

(Rl33, 425-

432, 443-447' 468-481, 488, 489, 492-494, 502-506, 512-513)
Carnes also had the Utah sales representative help in handling
collection of bills owing from purchasers of the Carnes products,
inc!udi~g

the filing of liens in Utah by Carnes to collect for

products sold here.

(R509-510)

Carnes did a substantial volume

of business each year in the State of Utah.

Sales through Long

Deming Utah, Inc., the sales representative were, 1968 -$26,451;
1969- $448,445; 1970- $82,433; 1971- $164,800; 1972- $127,338;
1973- $126,212.
1975 - $175,000.

The sales were estimated for 1974- $200,000;
These figures were supplied by Mr. Felton of

Long Deming Utah, Inc.

(R502)

A review of the sum total of the

testimony of the representatives of Carnes, including Mr. Weamer,
a present Carnes official, leaves no doubt of the scope and
extent of the conduct of business in Utah by this Company.
(R401-675)

The specific claim asserted by Ted R. Brown and

Associates, Inc. in this action against Carnes and Long Deming
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Utah, Inc. arose out of the contract and the actual supplying
of Carnes product for the incorporation into the Church Office
Building o: the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
constructed in Salt Lake City, Utah between 1968 and 1972.
(Rl60-163, 337-341)

It was testified by Mr. Ted R. Brown

that in the 1960's, upon learning of the Church Office Building
construction project which was to be undertaken with Bishop
George Cannon Young as Church architect, that he immediately
commenced to negotiate to try and supply Carnes material for
this job.

The testimony of not only

~lr.

Brown, but of Hr.

Richard Young, member of the architectural firm of George
Cannon Young; Mr. Quentin Tregeagle, the engineer for the project; and of Mr. Felton of Long Deming Utah, Inc., gave this
picture of the development and ultimate supplying of Carnes
material to the Church Office Building job.

After the initial

contacts by Mr. Brown, as sales representative of Carnes, it
was learned that Bishop Cannon Young, the architect, and Mr.
Treseagle were collaborating to develop

an idea for modular

air bar ventilating equipment which was Mr. Young's idea.

It

required special equipment which had not been developed before.
Bishop Cannon Young and Mr. Tregeagle were both concerned that
they should get the services of a competent manufacturer

and

supplier of air conditioning equipment in order to be sure
that the equipment which was necessary would function properly
and would do the job in the building to be constructed.

Ac-

cordingly, they requested that Mr. Brown arrange for Carnes to
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make a "mock up" of the proposed product and it was testified
that during the preliminary negotiations for this work, Mr.
Tregeagle, at Carnes' expense, visited the Carnes factory in
Verona, Wisconsin, and that he was shown by Carnes and their
engineers the method by which they proposed to put this product
into production and make the same available for the Church job.
Ultimately an actual "mock up" of the product was developed,
manufactured and sent to Utah with Mr. Watts, an engineer from
the sales division of Carnes, and Mr. Watts and Ted Brown set
up the "mock up" in a room at the Ambassador Club on Fifth
East in Salt Lake City, Utah, where a demonstration of the product was conducted for the benefit of Mr. Tregeagle and the
benefit of Bishop George Cannon Young, the church architect.
After

~je

de~onstration

and the assurances by the Carnes per-

sonnel directly to both Mr. Tregeagle and to Bishop Cannon
Young, it was decided that the Carnes material would be utilized
in the job and Richard Young testified that the architect
thereupon, together with the collaboration of Mr. Tregeagle,
wrote into the specifications a requirement for the Carnes
material.

Mr. Richard Young testified in this regard as follows:
"Q

And with what architectural firm are
you associated?

A

George Cannon Young Associates.

Q

Was that firm the architect for the
LDS Church Office Building in Salt
Lake City?

A

Yes, it was.
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Q

And in your capacity in that architectural firm, did you have anything
to do with the LOS Church Office
Building plans or construction?

A

Yes, I was the project architect.

Q

As such were you acquainted with the
material referred to generally in
heating and air diffusing part of
that construction known as Carnes
material?

A

Yes, I was.

Q

Do you know from what source that
material was obtained?

A

It was first introduced by our
mechanical engineer, Mr. Tregeagle,
and he was represented also by Ted
R. Brown.

Q

And was this material especially
designed and constructed by Carnes
for that job?

A

Yes, it was a special adaptation of
--for an air bar. We had looked the
market over and could not find the
diffuser that would meet all of the
requirements of our particular job.

Q

Now, was this air bar to which you
refer something that your father
designed with Mr. Tregeagle?

A

Yes, it was."

" ... A

At a later time that design was sent
on to Carnes.
They sent back shop
drawin0s on the manufacture of it.
And th~n in 1964 the associated mechanical engineer, Frank Bridgers, addressed
a letter to Carnes in care of Mr. Kenneth
Watts asking that assembly be tested in
their testing facility in Verona, Wisconsin. And he makes mention in his letter
that the mockup had been reviewed here
in Salt Lake, and several questions had
been raised about short circuiting of
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of the air supply in the air return
system.
Q

What is the mockup you referred to,
Mr. Young?

A

The mockup was sent out by Carnes.
It was an actual physical sample of
the assembly.
It was set up in the
Ambassador Club as was mentioned.

Q

Did you see it there?

A

Yes, I saw it there."

" ... A

In our specification.
In fact on the
air bar assembly since we had worked
with them exclusively we made it a
proprietary item then by addendum at
the request of the owner and included
one other manufacturer as being acceptable to supply that item.

Q

So that actually, then, by your specification you almose mandated that the
item be purchased from Carnes?

A

~es,

if you'd like me to read that
section of the specifications-- ... "

" ... The air bar ceiling distribution system
shall be as manufactured by Carnes Corporation or ap2roved equal." (R524-527)
Mr. Young further testified that there was difficulty with the
product once it had been installed, that it did not work properly.

(R527)

Mr. Tregeagle similarly testified and that at

least two engineers visited the job from Carnes Corporation in
an effort to solve problems arising from the installation of
this product in the job.

They were Norman Rick, an officer in

the sales end of the corporation, and Duaine Shackelford, the
project engineer or one of the chief engineers for the Company.
(RSSO)

Corroborative of the testimony of both Mr. Brown, Mr.
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Tregeagle and Mr. Young are the Exhibits which were introduced
and received by the Court.

(Exhibits 8P through 25P)

The sales

figures previously set forth for the year 1969 and 1970,
principal years of construction during which the Carnes material
was supplied to the Church Office Building, reflect that in
1969 the sales in Utah were $428,445 and in 1970 - 582,433.
(R502)
Under the Sales Representative Agreement which Ted R. Brown
and Associates, Inc. had with Carnes, upon the consummation of
the sale and the placement of the materials into the Church
Office Building, Brown became entitled to a commission for his
sales effort.

(Rl45-154, 149 and 442)

This was recognized ac-

cording to the testimony of Mr. Brown who referred to a letter
he had received from Dan Deviser, an officer of Carnes.

How-

ever, Carnes terminated the Sales Representative Agreement with
Brown and entered into a new Sales Representative Agreement
with Long Deming Utah, Inc.
the commission.

(R442)

(R442)

Mr. Brown never did receive

This action was brought to recover the

commission 'and damages for what is alleged to be the collusive
action of Carnes and Long Deming Utah, Inc. to deprive Brown of
its commission.

(Rl60-163, R337-341)

The Long Arm Statute of the State of Utah at 78-27-24 UCA
1953, as amended, reads as follows:
"78-27-24.
Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts submitting person to
jurisdiction. - Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102, whether or
not a citizen or resident of this State,
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who in person or through an agent does
any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual,
his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this
State as to any claim arising from:
"(1)
The transaction of any business
within this state;
"(2)
Contracting to supply services
or goods in this state;
It is the contention of Appellant that the record clearly shows
that Carnes Corporation did transact business within this State
and did contract to supply service or goods in this State and
that the claim of Ted R. Brown and Associates for the commission
arose out of this action of Carnes.
It is interesting to note that consistently in the presentation of this matter to the Court below, the attorney for
Carnes

~as

taken the position that if the L.D.S. Church was to

commence an action against Carnes, it could secure jurisdiction
over Carnes under the Long Arm Statute, but that the claim of
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. does not arise out of the
transaction of business in the State of Utah by Carnes and that
therefore, Ted R. Brown and Associates could not substantiate
service under the Statute upon Carnes.

We quote from the state-

ment made by Mr. Moyle to Judge Leary at the commencement of
this proceeding before Judge Leary:
"But I want to return to a discussion
of the Long Arm Statute and what--the way
that was argued to Judge Hall because it
puts the case in its perspective, and because
it will affect materially the type of evidence
that's presented here today.
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"The jurisdiction allocation and complaint in the plaintiff's complaint is
Section 78-27-24(2). Now, that says that
the court has jurisdiction over a party
contracting to supply services or goods in
this State.
"Now, if we move on to Section 26 of the
Long Arm Statute, that section provides, and
I quote,
Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against
a defendant in an action in which
jurisdiction over him is based upon
this act.
Now, the question that was ?resented to Judge
Hall, and the question that will be presented
to Your Honor today, is:
Is the plaintiff's
suit against Carnes one that arises from acts
enumerated "herein", specifically the jurisdictional allegations that this is a suit
arising out of a contract to supply services
or goods in this state.
"And I present to Your Honor that that is
not so. The suit is for breach of contract ... "
(R421)
Mr. Moyle later even offered to Stipulate, though the offer was
withdrawn:
"MR. MOYLE: We would be willing to
stipulate Your Honor, that the business
conducted by Carnes which results in the
importation of goods into the state of Utah
is such that in this instance, had suit been
brought by the purchaser of the goods manufactured and supplied by Carnes, to-wit the
owners of the LDS Church Office Building,
that there would have been sufficient nexus
to give this court jurisdiction over that
suit.
" (R435)
Mr. Moyle, subsequently backed away from the stipulation stating:
"I think I'll back off on that. We
conceded arguendo in the entire argument
before Hall, but there we didn't have live
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witnesses.
I was doing it to avoid
the necessity of the~.
I think since we
have live witnesses we'd better let the
facts show what the facts show and I'll
withdraw the proffer."
( R4 3 6)
It should be noted, however, that while backing away from the
stipulation, Mr. Moyle continued the admission that this was
the basis of his position taken before Judge Hall.

He did not

at any time offer any other position in regard to his resistance to the jurisdiction under the Long Arm Statute save and
except that he attempted to raise a problem based on the contention that the plaintiff's Complaint limited the claim of
jurisdiction under the Long Arm Statute to sub paragraph (2)
of 78-27-24 (Contracting to supply services or goods in this
State), and was not broad enough to permit it to avail itself
of the transaction 0f any business within this State, sub
paragrapt (:1.

Nhile counsel for Brown did not agree with

the interpretation placed upon the language embodied in the
Complaint:
"3.
Jurisdiction of the Court over Carnes
Corporation is based on Section 78-27-24
(2) and related provisions of the Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended." (Emphasis
ours)
Counsel

nevertheless asked leave of Court to file an amended

complaint to eliminate any possibility of confusion in regard
thereto and the Court granted this permission.

The verbal

order of the Court permitting amendment was reduced to writing
(R335-336), and the amended Complaint was in fact filed.
341)
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(R337-

It is respectfully submitted to the Court that even under
the more restricted interpretation of the Long Arm Statute
adopted by this Court up to the recent case of Abbott G. M.
Die~e~,_J~~-

14th, 1978,

vs. Piper Aircraft Corporation, filed April
578 P2d 850

, the argument contended fc~ by

Mr. Moyle could not be supported.
Hill vs.

The Zales Jewelry case,

Zale Corporation, decided March 9, 1971, 25 U2d 357,

482 P2d 332, involved a matter wherein Hill, the plaintiff,
sought to enforce against Zale Corporation, a Texas corporation,
a claim for his wages and an incentive award, vacation pay,
and moving expenses, which he claimed to be due to him for
services which he rendered to the defendant at Anchorage, Alaska.
The transaction of business in the State of Utah by Zale Corporation had nothing whatever to do with Mr. Hill's claim and
the Utah Supreme Court found that the minimal contacts required
in Utah had been maintained by Zale and allowed Hill to bring
the action in the State of Utah.

We also point out that the

International Shoe C5se decided by the United States Supreme
Court,

326 US 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, did not in

any manner involve a claim by a customer of the shoe company
but involved the effort by the State of Washington to collect
taxes based upon the fact that the International Shoe Company
had been doing business within the State of Washington.

We

urge upon this Court that the Appellant Brown is asserting a
claim for a commission arising directly out of the sale of merchandise to a Utah customer, to-wit:

The Church of Jesus Christ
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of Latter Day Saints, is not as remote from the transaction of
business within the State of Utah as either Mr. Hill in the
Zale case or the State of Washington in the International Shoe
case.

Under the doctrine ennunciated by the Court in the

Abbott

G~

case vs. Piper Aircraft Corporation, supra the

activities of Carnes within the State of Utah establish beyond
any question of a doubt its presence here for all purposes.
We respectfully submit that the service of Summons on Carnes
accomplished on either or both occasions under the Long Arm
Statute would be sufficient to permit Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. to proceed in the Courts of the State of Utah
agai~st

this defendant to permit the Utah Courts to try the

action based on Brown's claim of a commission due for sale of
Carnes pradJcts utilized in the construction of the L.D.S.
Church Office Building located in Salt Lake City, Utah.
POINT II
SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON OFFICERS OF LONG
DEMING UTAH, INC. AND UTEMP-UTAH AIR
SALES, CARNES' EXCLUSIVE SALES REPRESENTATIVES IN UTAH, WAS GOOD SERVICE
OF SU~10NS ON CARNES CORPORATION UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4(e) (4) URCP.
In Point I of this brief some factual information has
been presented concerning the activities of Long Deming Utah,
Inc. and of Utemp-Utah Air Sales in their capacity as the
contractual sales representatives acting in the State of Utah
for Carnes.

Without reiterating all of that information under

this Point, we refer the Court again to those factual discloSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The evidence showed that Long Deming Utah, Inc. entered
into a contract with Carnes Corporation to act as its exclusive
sales representative in the State of Utah.

This contract,

dated September 3, 1968, was in full force and effect from that
date in 1968 through the year 1973.

(R20l-218)

Clause 13 of

the contract, found at R217, specifically defines the obligation of the distributor or representative to cooperate fully
and promptly with Carnes in the sale of products covered by
the Agreement.

We quote the provision.

"13.
Cooperation of Distributor or Representative with Carnes
The distributor or representative agrees
at all times to cooperate fully and promptly
with Carnes in the sale of all products
covered in this agreement, and to render
such information and reports as and when
such information is requested, and to
furnish to Carnes copies of all correspondence, quotations, and invoices, covering
the products covered by this agreement, when
such information is specifically requested
by Carnes."
Mr. Ted R. Brown, who acted under a similar Sales Agreement, testified as to the wide range of activities that he conducted for Carnes in the State of Utah as its representative,
including the setting up of the "mock up" participated in by
Mr. Watts of the air bar construction to be manufactured by
Carnes for the Church Office Building.
22P and 23P)

(R568-569, 577, Exhibit

He related activities he had undertaken for Carnes

in handling credit and collection problems substantiated by
Exhibits 2 and 3, and handling of damaged shipments.
Exhibit 4).

All disclose

(R532,

the active conduct of business in
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the State of Utah by Ted R. Brown for Carnes.

!'lr. Felton of

Long Deming Utah, Inc. was specific in the duties which he
performed.

He also stated that Carnes frequently sent repre-

sentatives from the horne office into the State of Utah to discuss with Long Deming personnel their sales records, their
performance, new products, and introduction of new products.
(R503)

He admitted that Carnes made suggestions as to things

which Carnes could supply and the manufacturing processes they
could provide.

He admitted that he handled warrantys and claims

under warrantys for Carnes, acting as an employee of Long
Deming Utah, Inc., the sales representative of Carnes.

He

specifically referred to a given paragraph of the Sales Representative Agreement which he felt governed Long Deming's
activities in that regard.
"Q

A

(RSOS)

He was asked:

Aid as the exclusive representative,
d:~ you deem that it was necessary
fer you to undertake and act as the
intermediary as you describe in the
warranty claims?
That's correct."

In regard to the dissemination of the Carnes catalogue and
sales at R507:
"Q

So that in some manner you disseminated the knowledge to people of this
State if they wanted to buy Carnes
material, Long Deming is the place to
get it, is that correct?

A

That's right.

Q

How would that be done?

A

We published a listing of all of the
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manufacturers represented by us and
distributed to appropriate contractors,
architects, engineer, that might constitute a market for our products.
Q

Did that give your office address and
your telephone number and where you
could be reached?

A

Yes."

At page 509 of the record, Mr. Felton of Long Deming Utah, Inc.
was asked:
"Q

Now, did you ever have anything to do
with the collection of any of the
amounts that were due for Carnes
material?

A

Yes.

Q

What did you do?

A

Larger projects.
The Carnes Corporation have often asked us to provide
them with various job information
including such things as the names of
all of the parties that were party to
the contract - That is, the owner, the
general contractor, the mechanical contractor, the sheet metal contractor, so
forth - whether or not the job was a
public or private job, whether or not
the job was bonded, the name of the
bonding company, the address of the
bonding company, all of the information
necessary for Carnes to protect its
interest in the job, its equipment.

Q

Now, suppose that they didn't pay? Did
you ever take any action to try and collect such an account?

A

During the course of our representation
for Carnes, we assisted them in collection efforts from time to time.

Q

Did you ever file a lien against a job?

A

We were not--we could not file a lier
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for them, but we helped them in obtaining legal descriptions and so forth,
details for them to file the lien.
Q

Did they ever file a lien to your knowledge in this State?

A

My memory is a little bit hazy, but I am
quite sure that they did.
I remember
Carnes being involved in a lien, but I
couldn't provide any more details than
that."
(R510)

With respect to the Church Office job, Mr. Pelton testified
that when trouble developed, he worked with the representatives
from Carnes in solving the problem and that Carnes sent out
Norm Rick, a products manager and that they sent an engineer
whose name he could not recall.
"Q

Mr. Felton was asked:

And did you continue to pursue this on
behalf of Carnes as their representative
in the State of Utah to try and effect
a correction of this trouble?

A

Yes.

Q

And did Carnes on several occasions
before it was finally concluded, send
representatives out to work on this
problem?

A

Yes."

(R513)

Mr. Carlsen of Utemp-Utah Air Sales testified that Utemp-Air
Sales was working as the representative for Carnes in the State
of Utah under an agreement dated September 16, 1975, which was
replaced by a new agreement April 22, 1977.
made an Exhibit in the file.

The agreement is

(Exhibit lD, R493)

Mr. Carlsen

outlined similar activities conducted by Utemp-Utah Air Sales
as did Mr. McDowell of that company, in their respective testimonies to those referred to in the record under the testimony
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given by Mr. Felton and Mr. Ted R. Brown.

There is thus a

long period of time in which Carnes has had the benefit of
doing business within the State of Utah through the activities
of its sales representative.
Appellant maintains that Service of Summons upon the duly
authorized officer of Long Deming Utah, Inc. and subsequently
Utemp-Utah Air Sales constituted a good and sufficient service
under the provisions of Rule 4(e) (4) URCP, which provides:
"(4)
Upon any corporation, not herein
otherwise provided for, upon a partnership
or other unincorporated association which
is subject to suit under a common naMe, by
delivering a copy t~ereof to an officer, a
managing or general agent, or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process and, if the
agent is one authorized by statute to
receive service and the statute so requires,
by also mailing a copy to the defendant.
If no such officer or agent can be found
in the county in which the action is brought,
then upon any such officer or agent, or any
clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk,
or other agent having the ~anagement, direction or control of any property of such
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the state.
If no such officer or agent can be found
in the state, and the defendant has, or
advertises or holds itself out as having,
an office or place of business in this
state, or does business in this state,
then upon the person doing such business
or in charge of such office cr place of
business."
Increasingly, it is being recognized that a corporation
can do business in a State through an independent contractor
and that the fact that such business is done through an independent contractor does not, in any manner, protect the foreign
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corporation from process within the State in which it does
business through such a contractor.

We quote Fletcher's

Cyclopedia of Corporations (Perm Ed) Volume 18, revised 1977,
Section 8724, as follows, to-wit:
"8724. -Contracts and transactions through
resident agent, representative or independent contractor.
"Even before the International Shoe case,
it was universally held that it was not
essential to jurisdiction in personam over
a foreign corporation that it be physically
present within the state, but it is sufficient if it exists in the state of its
domicile, and acts by agent in the state
assuming jurisdiction. And the fact that
the foreign corporation's agent in the
state is a corporation is not material.
Thus where a foreign corporation maintains
a stock of goods on the premises of, and
in the charge of, a domestic warehouse
company, and furnishes such company a
credit list authorizing it to allow
certal~ customers to withdraw goods on
thelr own written orders, and the company
notifles the foreign corporation of the
details of its delivery of goods to customers, and the customers are billed directly
from the home office of the foreign corporation, the warehouse company is agent
of the foreign corporation, and its
activities on its behalf constitute
doing business in the state by the corporation, and service of process on the
warehouse company is service on the
corporation, and this is so though the
warehouse company functions in a similar
way for others and disclaims the agency.
"And where a foreign insurance company
empowers a domestic corporation to adjust
losses for it, and letters written by the
company refer to the domestic corporation
as its representative, and correspondence
between the two corporations also evidences
the existence of an agency, the foreign
company is doing business in the state
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through the agency of the domestic
corporation, and service of summons
upon the latter is valid service on
such company.
"But it is equally well settled that
the mere presence or "doing business"
will not suffice to confer jurisdiction
in personam over the defendant foreign
corporation.
"The recent trend is that a foreign
corporation is not immunized from service
of process merely because it operates
through an independent contractor. While
it is essential under due process that
there be a showing that the foreign corporation purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, it is recognized
that such activities may be carried on bv
an independent agent or manufacturer's representative.
In addition the mere fact
that the agent works for several principals
should not be necessarily determinative of
the question. Thus, in a decision following
the International Shoe doctrine, a foreign
magazine publisher was held subject to
service of process for an alleged libel
where all the printing and distribution
was done in the forum, though by a domestic independent contractor."
If a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in
the State of Utah can contract to have services performed to
enable it to do business as Carnes did, in active competition
with Utah residents and merchants in the manner testified to
by Mr.

Brown, Mr. Felton, Mr. Carlsen, and Mr. McDowell, it is

neither unfair nor unjust to also vest that representative with
the capacity under the law to accept service of Summons for
that corporation and to base jurisdiction of the foreign corporation in Utah Courts on such service.

We submit that the
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service upon Mr. Felton, asan officer of Long Demlng Utah, Inc.
while that corporation was acting under written sales agreement as the representative of Carnes in the State of Utah, and
the subsequent service upon Mr. Richard Bartlett McDowell, an
officer of Utemp-Utah Air Sales

while that company was acting

as a representative under a written agreement with Carnes,
constitute good and sufficient service on Carnes and should
subject that corporation to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts.
POINT III
THE DECISIONS AND ORDERS OF JUDGS HALL AND
OF JUDGE LEARY QUASHING SERVICE OF SUMMONS
ON CARNES, FOR WHATEVER REASOc-JS, ARE Dl
ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
As has been previously explained in the Statement of Facts
and under Points I and II, this matter first came on before
Judge

Gorjo~

?. Hall on Carnes' Motion to Quash Service of

Summons and Dismiss.

(Rl39, 124)

The matter had been noticed

up before the La\v and Motion Division of the Court.

(Rl24)

It

was submitted to the Court on the basis of the Complaint as
filed

(Rl60-165) and the Affidavit of Mr. Ted R. Brown, Presi-

dent of Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc.

(Rl33-l34)

The affi-

davit of Nichols admitted the validity of the Sales Agreement
entered into by Carnes with Ted

R. Brown for services to be

performed by Brown for Carnes in the State of Utah, a copy of
which had been filed with the Complaint marked Exhibit "A".
(Rl60-163)

(Apparently through oversight the exhibit was net

attached to the Complaint.

On November 20, 1973, counsel
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having learned of this error, immediately filed the exhibit
"A" and served COflies on counsel for Carnes and Long Demins
Utah, Inc.) (Rl44-l54)

tlr. Nichols' affidavit also admi tteci

that plaintiff, Ted R. Bro1m and Associates, did act as a sales
representative for Carnes, soliciting orders from contractors
in Utah and transmitting such orders to Carnes and that all
such orders received by Carnes, including the orders for the
Church Office Building

involved in this case, were shipped

directly by Carnes to the ultimate purchaser in Utah and that
payments therefore were made directly to Carnes by the purchaser.
(Rl36, par. 5)

Mr. Brown's affidavit stated that between May

24, 1961, and August 29, 1968, Ted R. Brown and Associates,
Inc., had been the authorized distributor or representative of
Carnes in Utah and that to his knowledge Carnes had contracted
to supply goods, wares and merchandise to buyers within the
State of Utah on many occasions and that the goods, wares and
merchandise were warranted to the buyers as expressed on Carnes
Corporation's acknowledgment of order issued to such buyers.
His affidavit stated that pursuant to such contracts, Carnes
had supplied goods to persons in this State and had paid to
Brown a commission based on the sales in accordance with the
agreement which Carnes had for Brown's services.

The affidavit

stated that:
"the sale and delivery of the goods that
gave rise to the present claim was consummated in the State of Utah and said goods
were, in fact delivered to and incorporated
into the LDS Church Office Building in Salt
Lake City." (Rl34, par. 3)
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These admissions by Nichols and by Brown were not traversed.
The hearing was scheduled on October lst, 1974.

In the after-

noon of September 27, 1974, counsel for Brown was served Wlth
a Memorandum in Support of Defendant Carnes Corporation's
Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss, prepared by counsel for
Carnes.

(Rl25-l32)

The 27th day of September was a Friday.

Counsel for Brown had no opportunity to prepare any responsive
memorandum for the Court before hearing on Tuesday, October lst.
At the oral argument in Court, Mr. Moyle acting for Carnes,
laid most of his emphasis upon the contention that the claim
asserted by Brown did not come within the purview of the Long
Arm Statute and that therefore the jurisdiction over Carnes
must fail.

(R435-436)

contentl8n

t~at

However, he extensively argued also his

the minimal contacts required under the doctrine

enunciated by the Supreme Court of Utah in the Hill vs. Zale
Corporation case, 25 U2d 357; 482 P2d 332, were not met.

(Rl251

To counsel for the Appellant Brown, the affidavits of Nichols
and Brown seemed to establish the fact that Carnes was indeed
contracting to and in fact supplying goods in the State of Utah.
The question of whether Brown was in fact asserting a claim
based upon the enumerated acts mentioned in the Long Arm Statute
seemed apparent on its face, since the claim was for commissions
based on sales of Carnes material to the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints to be incorporated in the Church Office
Building.

The fact that a claim for damages and collusion be-

tween Carnes and Long Deming Utah, Inc., in depriving Brown of
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the commission was alleged in the Complaint certainly did not
appear to be any basis upon which jurisdiction under the Long
Arm Statute could be denied.

No mention in the Memorandum

submitted by Carnes or in oral argument was specifically made
by Counsel for Carnes or Brown about the service of summons
which had been made on Long Deming Utah, Inc., as the sales
representative for Carnes under Rule 4 (e) (4} URCP.
\"/hen Judge Hall entered his Order entitled "JC'DG)IItENT"
after having taken the matter under advisement, he gave no
clue as to the basis upon which he was granting the motion of
the defendant Carnes.

(Rl2l-122}

He not only quashed the

Service of Summons but he dismissed the claims.

(Rll7}

he could not dismiss the plaintiff's claim was clear.
for Brown believed that the entire Order was in error.

That
Counsel
The

portion wherein the Court dismissed the claims ignored the
fact that Long Deming had been validly served with Summons as
a party defendant and had duly answered the Complaint, and no
request had been made on its part for dismissal.

(Rl4l-143)

A motion was filed on behalf of Brown asking the Court to
reconsider its action or vacate or amend the Judgment.

As set

forth before, it had been learned that apparently, funds still
remained due to Carnes from the Church or its general contractor
and accordingly, counsel did not immediately call up for argument its motion for reconsideration but proceeded with an
attac~ent.

Facts herein,

As more particularly set forth in the Statement of
(pg. 9 to 12} this resulted in considerable delay.
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Counsel for Carnes called up both that Motion and the previously filed Motion of Brown for Reconsideration of Judge Hall's
Judgment for hearing.

(R93-96)

This matter was heard by Judge

Hall who refused to consider the matter of the Release of
Attachment stating it should be heard by the Judge who granted
the attachment.

He amended his previous Judgment by striking

the portion which related to the dismissal of claims.

He

denied the request for reconsideration of the Motion to Quash.
(R74-75)

Counsel for Brown had specifically asked Judge Hall

to allow an opportunity to present evidence on the matter of
the JUrisdiction under the Long Arm Statute and on the matter
of the validity of the service on the sales representative of
Carnes, Long Deming Utah,
reco~s~dec

(R74-75i

Inc., but Judge Hall declined to

the matter and would not grant such a hearing.
Again Judge Hall gave no clue as to what had moti-

vated his decision.

Whether he considered the matter of

minimal contacts of compelling importance, or whether he
acceded to the argument of Mr. Moyle on the fact that Brown
could not claim the benefit for the Long Arm Statute was not
disclosed.

Counsel for Brown knew that the factual situation

with regard to the activities of Carnes in the State of Utah
could be clarified if a hearing could be obtained at which
evidence could be presented and witnesses examined.
could not be done on the Law and Motion calendar.

This
The problem

confronting counsel for Brown was whether to immediately appeal
Judge Hall's decision, which counsel considered erroneous on
the existing state of the record, or whether it would be
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better to try to get a hearing at which the facts could be
adduced in regard to Carnes' activities in Utah. The election
was made to preserve the right to appeal from Judge Hall's
decision by filing a Notice of Intention to Appeal under
72(a) URCP, and proceed with the hearing on the Motion for
Release of Attachment which posed a possible alternative method
oE obtaining jurisdiction.

It appeared to counsel that in

moving for a release of attachment when no propert:• had been
successfully attached and in asking that the Court consider
the Constitutionality of the Utah Attachment procedure, went
far beyond the scope of a special appearance and constituted a
general appearance by counsel for Carnes.

(Rl02)

Accordingly,

counsel filed a Motion to have the Court declare that Carnes
had entered a general appearance and directing that it respond
to the Complaint or be found in default.

(R72-73)

Carnes'

Hotion for Release of Attachment and Brown's Motion for
Declaration of General Appearance by Carnes were both noticed
up for hearing before Judge Hanson.

(R68-69)

Judge Hanson

released the attachment but found that Carnes had entered a
general appearance and ordered that it suitably plead within
ten days.

(R65)

Carnes immediately petitioned for an Inter-

locutory Appeal to this Court.

Appellant in a separate Peti-

tion, asked that this Court grant an Interlocutory Appeal from
Judge Hall's decision.

This Petition was not acted on by the

Court which simply refunded the petitioner's fee.
locutory Appeal was granted to Carnes.
t~e

Supreme Court)

The Inter-

(Docket No. 14057 in

This Court held that Carnes had not
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entered a general appearance.

Accordingly, counsel was still

left with the problem of getting the facts concerning Carnes'
activities in Utah more fully developed through having an
evidentiary hearing before the Court.

A try at an unprece-

dented procedure based on a Motion to Declare Service of
Summons Sufficient, heard by Judge Taylor, died aborning, for
the Judge refused to set any hearing for the taking
say~ng

dence

a procedure.

o~

evi-

that he could find no basis in the rules for such
(R224)

Rule 4(b)

URCP specifically provides that Summons can be

served on a party at any time before trial if one party to
the action has been served.

Counsel therefor decided to re-

serve Summons on Carnes which was done by service personally
by tr.e

Sher~ff

of Wisconsin on a designated process agent, and

in Utah ny serving an officer of Utemp-Utah Air Sales, the
sales representative in Utah under contract with Carnes.
230, 234-235)

(R229-

Counsel for Carnes promptly filed a Motion to

Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction.

(R232)

Instead of

noticing up that Motion for hearing before the Law and Motion
Division of the Court, counsel for Brown filed a Motion asking
that a special hearing be set at which witnesses could be
produced and evidence presented on the matter of Carnes'
activities in Utah, as a basis for resisting the Motion to
Dismiss and to Quash.
by Judge David Dee.

(R237)

This Motion of Brown was heard

An imposing memorandum of authorities

filed by counsel for Bro>m, and a reply thereto by counsel
for Carnes.

The Court permitted a

long oral argument. Among

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-42-

the contentions made by Carnes in support of its position that
no special hearing should be granted was a claim that the
entire matter of jurisdiction over Carnes was res judicata
by virtue of the previous Order of Judge Hall.

This position

was argued extensively orally and in the memoranda to Judge
Dee.

(R2 55-2 57, 28 3-292)

requested by Brown,
filed by Carnes.

Judge Dee granted the hearing as

(R304) and overruled objections thereto

(R302)

Interlocutory Appeal.

Carnes promptly filed a petition for
This petition was based primarily on

the claim that the Order of Judge Hall made the jurisdictional
matter res judicata.

This Court denied the Petition for Inter-

locutory Appeal and allowed the special hearing to go forward.
(Docket No. 15564, R320)
It should be recognized that this Court has made known the
purpose of an Interlocutory Appeal in opinions handed down over
the years.

One of the leading authorities is the case of

Manwill vs. Oyler, 11 U2d 433, 361 P2d 177.

In that case the

Court states:
"(1)
The purpose to be served in granting an interlocutory appeal is to get direclty
at and dispose of the issues as quickly as
possible consistent with thoroughness and
efficiency in the administration of justice.
But that objective is not always served by
granting such an appeal.
In some instances,
the necessity of remanding for trial may
result in protracting rather than shortening the litigation.
For this reason, whenever it appears likely that the matter in
dispute can be finally disposed of upon a
trial; or where they may become moot; or
where they can, without involving any
serious difficulty, abide determination in
the event of an appeal after the trial, the
desired objective is best served by refuslng
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to entertain an interlocutory appeal
and letting the case proceed to trial.
Then, if an appeal is necessary, there is
this additional advantage: the issues of
facts have been determined and the record
is viewed in the light most favorable to the
judgment, instead of the reverse.
"(2)
On the other hand, the desired objective of efficiency in procedure can be promoted, and the interlocutory appeal is properly granted, if it appears essential to adjudicate principles of law or procedure in advance as a necessary foundation upon which
the tr~al may proceed; or ~f there is a h~gh
likelihood that the litigation can be finally
disposed of on such an appeal." (Emphasis ours)
Since in the instant case, if the contention of the counsel
for Carnes that Judge Hall's decision made the matter of jurisdiction res judicata was upheld on

interlocutor~

appeal, it

would dispose of the litigation, it apparently meant this
Court did not agree with counsel's position and upheld Judge
Dee's Qrder, and that Brown was entitled to an evidentiary
heJc.~=

:or the purpose of developing the facts necessary to a

proper consideration of the jurisdictional question.

That

interpretation of this Court's action on the Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal is entirely consistent with the position
taken in other doing business within the State of Utah and
Long Arm Statute cases wherein the Court has held:
"The question here, that of whether a nonresident is doing business in the State is
strictly a factual one, and each case,
therefore, must be determined on its own
peculiar and significant facts to determine
if the local forum has jurisdiction to try
and adjudge the claims or obligations of
one domiciled elsewhere." Foreign Studv
League vs. Holland-America Line, 27 U2d
442, 497 P2d 244 at 244.
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It is also consistent with the viewpoint that has been
expressed by not only this Court but by the Supreme court of
the United States in the International Shoe Co. vs. Washington
case,

326 US310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, and cited with

approval by this Court in Hill vs. Zale, Supra:
" ... due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" 482 P2d 332 at 334.
We submit that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice can hardly be violated by requiring that Carnes
respond to Summons before the Courts of the State of Utah in
the face of the involvement of that company in the sale of goods
and products in this State to residents of this State, and in
particular, the designing, manufacturing, providing, warranting,
and collecting some $450,000.00 for materials incorporated into
the Church Office Building job.
We believe in refusing to grant the Interlocutory Appeal,
this Court may have also considered that Judge Hall's Order,
as contended by Brown, was contrary to law.

Counsel for Carnes

admitted in argument before Judge Hall that if the L.D.S. Church
were to commence an action against Carnes, it could secure
jurisdiction over Carnes under the Long Arm Statute.

(R435-436)

This constituted an admission of the minimal contacts in this
State and the fact of having supplied goods and services and
having transacted business within the State, sufficient to
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court.

The only point then left for consideration by Judge

Hall was the novel argument that Brown did not qualif:/ as one
entitled to claim the benefits of the Long Arm Statute because
Carnes contended that Brown's claim did not arise from acts
en•.ll'llerated in the Statute.

(R422)

How a claim could more dir-

ectly arise from the acts of the defendant Carnes enumerated
under the act than Brown's claim is difficult to conceive.
Brown's claim arises out of the sale and delivery of goods by
Carnes to the L.D.S. Church for incorporation into the Church
Office Building, for the sale of which Carnes owes Brown a
commission.

In the Zale case, Mr. Hill, the plaintiff, sought

to enforce a wage claim for services rendered in Alaska, and
he chose as hls forum the State of Utah.

This Court in that

case stated that the extent to which the alleged facts of the
assertec clalm arose from activities within the State was only
one of

~ne

factors to be considered in determining whether

jurisdiction could be established in Utah.

Even though Hill

did not serve Zale in Utah, the Supreme Court found no injustice in granting jurisdiction over the corporation to enforce the wage claim for services performed in Alaska.

This

Court in the Foreign Study League vs. Holland-America Line,
27 U2d 442, 497 P2d 244, found even more tenuous contacts with
Utah residents sufficient to support a law suit in thls State
against the Holland-America Line.
delivered into the State.

In that case, nothing was

Sales of cruises on the ships of

this line were solicited by sales agents who receJ.ved a commission for making such sales.

The Line d1d noth1ng in thls
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State save make a combined social and business call on an
"agent" in this State.

We respectfully submit that reviewed

in the light of these standards, Judge Hall's decision was
clearly wrong.
In considering the action taken by Judge Leary, it should
be born in mind that at the start of the hearing before Judge
Leary, he was informed of the fact that the Order under which
he was acting, issued by Judge Dee, had been the subject matter
of a Petition of Interlocutory Appeal, and that the Appeal had
been denied by this Court.

Despite the mandate given by Judge

Dee's Order, and the fact that the Supreme Court did not, when
it clearly could have done so, stop the hearing under Judge
Dee's Order by granting the Interlocutory Appeal, Judge Leary
nevertheless failed to make a decision based upon the factual
situation presented before him and instead grounded his Order
upon his view of the matter which is clearly shown by the
Memorandum

Decision which he entered, and which, among other

things provided:
"1.
That plaintiff had a right to present evidence in opposition to defendant
Carnes' Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss
which came on for hearing before Judge Hall
October l, 1974.
"2.
That plaintiff had an opportunity
from the date of the filing of the complaint
(October 26, 1973) until the hearing on defendant Carnes' Motion to Quash Service and
Dismiss (October l, 1974) within which to
conduct discovery for the purpose of obtaining evidence as to Carnes coming within
the provisions of long arm statute and as
to Long Deming Utah, Inc. being the agent
of Carnes for the service of process.
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"3. That substantially all of the
evidence presented before this Court was
peculiarly within the knowledge of plaintiff,
was obtainable by interrogation of the witnesses Young and Tregeagle, or by discovery
prior to the hearing before Judge Hall on
October 1, 1974.
"4. That plaintiff commenced no discovery until January 8, 1975.
"5. That the testimony of the witnesses
McDowell and Carlsen of Utemp, Inc. was
cumulative.
"6. That the service upon defendant
Carnes Corporation by leaving with Lynn
Felton and the service upon defendant Carnes
Corporation by leaving with Richard McDowell
were identical in the sense that at the time
of service each was an officer of the then
Sales Representative of Carnes Corporation
in the State of Utah.
"7. That the motions to strike
made during the course of the hearing
by defendant Carnes should be denied.
"8. That Service of Summons upon
defendant Carnes should be quashed but
the Amended Complaint should not be dismissed.
"The Court Concludes:
"Plaintiff is entitled to an order overruling the motions to strike made by defendant Carnes.
"That this Court cannot overrule the
decision of another judge of the same
Court and that consistent with the ruling
of Judge Hall, defendant is entitled to a
judgment quashing service of process on
Carnes Corporation but not dismissing the
Amended Complaint."
Finding No. 1 is true but as a practical matter with Judge
Hall on the Law and Motion Division of the Court, the counsel
both knew that nothing more than the affidavits could be preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sented to that division of the Court.

Since the matter was

not discussed before Judge Leary and no isse was raised in
regard to that matter, he could not have known nor did he
attempt to inform himself as to whether a hearing had been requested before Judge Hall at which testimony could be siven.
Finding No. 2 as a statement of broad general principal
may be correct, but it was not in fact correct and Judge Leary
did not request any enlightenment on this matter.

No accusa-

tion was made that counsel had not proceeded properly nor was
counsel asked to afford any explanation as to why discovery had
not been undertaken prior to 1975.

It must be remembered that

Carnes had immediately, and within the time allowed by rule
for a responsive pleading, filed its Motion to Dismiss and
Quash Service of Summons.

Counsel for

Car~es

took the position

that discovery conducted by plaintiff after the filing of such
a Motion would not be binding on Carnes because Carnes could
not participate in such discovery as it did not recognize the
jurisdiction of the Utah Court and that therefore it did not
have to participate in or be bound by any such discovery efforts.
Finding No.

3 is not in conformity with the evidence.

facts did not lie within the knowledge of plaintiff.

The

They had

to be obtained from the witnesses who only became available to
the plaintiff after a special hearing had been set and subpoenas
could be issued, and were in fact issued.

So long as the atti-

tude of counsel for Carnes was that discovery could not be conducted which would be binding upon it, plaintiff could not
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nesses to any voluntary disclosure could not be better demonstrated than by the immediate reaction of Long Del'ling Utah, Inc.,
which through its counsel immediately sought a protective order
and proceeded to contest the right of the plaintiff to any infor-

mation concerning the transactions involving the Church Office
Building or involving Long Deming's relationship to Carnes.
(R99-101)

It was only when Judge Hanson ruled that Carnes had

made a general appearance and was subject to the JUrlsdiction
of the Court that any meaningful discovery became possible.

In

open Court, Judge Hanson was informed by all counsel, including
counsel for Long Deming, that by reason of his ruling, consideration of most of the matters raised by Long Deming's Motion for
Protective Order had been rendered moot, and Judge Hanson incorporated this into his Order:
.. and the Court having announced its
dlsposition of the aforesaid motions and
it thereupon being stipulated in open
court by the attorney for the Plaintiff,
Allen H. Tibbals, and the attorney for
the defendant, Long Deming Utah, Inc.,
for the protective order and to quash
request for the production of certain
documents was rendered in part moot by
the decision of the court on the prior
motions and that any remaining issues
the counsel believed could be resolved
by conference ... " (R65-66)
The issue of whether or not counsel for Brown had
conducted the discovery proceedings and had
correct manner was neither raised,
Leary.

~roceeded

~roperl~

in a

argued or presented to Judge

Likewise, Judge Leary was not asked to pass upon the

question of whether he could or could not
of Judge Hall.

'overrule the declSl0°

The issue of the status cf the matter before
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-so-

Judge Hall had been preserved for
Supreme Court.

ulti~ate

conslderation by the

It was not submitted to Judge Leary.

He was

acting under the Order of Judge Dee and was mandated by that
Order to make a determination of whether Carnes had or had not
by its conduct and contacts submitted itself to the jurisdiction
of the Utah Courts and whether or not the sales representatives
under contract with Carnes to act as such were qualified as
?ersons upon whom Service of Summons could be had to secure
Jurisdiction over Carnes.
It has long been recognized as elementary in the law that
relief cannot be granted by the Court upon its own motion on
issues neither raised or tried.
" ... While it is true that our rules provide for liberality in procedure and the
sranting of relief to which the evidence
shows a party entitled, this does not go
so far as to authorize the granting of
relief on issues neither raised nor tried."
Cornia vs. Cornia, 546 ?2d 890 at 893.
The Oregon Supreme Court has similarly held:
"It is well settled that the pleadings
may be introduced to show lvhat was adjudicated, and in the absence of conflicting evidence they are, of course,
conclusive.
It is elementary law that
the relief granted must necessarily be
responsive to and in conformity with the
pleadings and proof. (citing other cases)"
Jarvis vs. Indemnity Insurance Co. of
North America, 227 Ore. 508, 363 P2d
740 at 743.
The Order of Judge Dee under which the matter was presented to Judge Leary did not call for Judge Leary to pass upon
any of the matters which he incorporated in this manner into
his decision.

Objections to the decision and the proposed
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order by Judge Leary were duly filed by counsel for
(R342-347)

A hearing was held thereon and Judge

Brown.

Lear~

admltted

the Order presented did not express his intent1on:
"But I would--do make this comment 1-'r.
Moyle; that I don't think thot the
Order which was prepared for the Court's
signature prcisely sets forth what t~e
Court intended by its ~emorandum decision ... " (R395)
However, Judge Leary did not rectify the Order.

It was filed

as originally presented and Appellant's objPctions •.;ere 0·:erruled.

(RJ57)

reversed.

-Judge Leary's action •.:as er-roneous and should be

Fortunately, the factuol dat2 obtained at tnE

hearing before Judge Leary is available for

t~e

review and

consideration of this Court in determining Justice and equity
between the parties. (R397, 675, Ex.

l-25 inc.)

CONCLCSIOcl
We respectfully submit that a sense of fair play and
justice and equity require that this Court find that Carnes
has done business within the State of Utah in such a manner
as to subject it to the jurisdiction of the l'ta;1 Courts.

Tile

duration and vagaries of the battle before the lower Court
and on Interlocutory Appeal to this Court should not obscure
the essential necessity of recognizing the rights of the parties
to fair and impartial consideration of the issues.

The facts

as developed support the jurisdiction of the Ctah Court over
the controversy between Brown, Carnes and Long Deming
Inc.

Uta~.

We ask that this honorable Court so rule and mandate this
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action to the lower Court for a trial upon the merits.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January, 1979.
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